El contenido de la presente discusión de Análisis Filosófico surge a partir de diversas actividades organizadas por mí en SADAF y en la UBA. En primer lugar, Roy Cook dictó en SADAF el seminario de investigación intensivo On Yablo's Paradox durante la última semana de julio de 2011. En el seminario, el profesor Cook presentó el manuscrito aún sin finalizar de su libro The Yablo Paradox: An Essay on Circularity, Oxford, Oxford UP, (en prensa). Extensas y apasionantes discusiones ocurrieron durante (...) esos encuentros sobre circularidad y construcciones infinitarias. Fue en ese tiempo, donde me surgió la idea de editar una discusión sobre las ideas que Cook defiende en ese trabajo. El proyecto era una extensión natural del trabajo que veníamos realizando con mi grupo de investigación en temas vinculados al concepto de verdad, autorreferencia y paradojas. Luego, durante el segundo cuatrimestre de 2011, dicté el seminario La paradoja de Yablo, en el instituto de filosofía de la UBA. Algunos de los borradores de los artículos que aparecen en el presente volumen tienen su origen en este curso. Finalmente, invité por segunda vez al profesor Cook al Symposium on Yablo's Paradox realizado en SADAF en julio de 2012. En esta oportunidad, se presentaron las versiones finales de los artículos de Lavinia Picollo, Paula Teijeiro, Federico Pailos, Diego Tajer, Lucas Rosenblatt e Ignacio Ojea que se incluyen a continuación. El encuentro incluyó las inteligentes réplicas del profesor Cook y profundas discusiones sobre los mencionados temas lógicosemánticos. Quiero agradecer a todos los integrantes del Gaf[log] que participaron activamente en las mencionadas actividades, ya sea en la publicación posterior o en los coloquios y seminarios que le dieron origen. Agradezco al Comité editorial de Análisis Filosófico, en especial a Alberto Moretti, quienes apoyaron desde sus comienzos este proyecto. Finalmente, y de manera especial, quiero expresar mi gratitud al profesor Roy Cook, quien no sólo apoyó e inspiró el proyecto desde sus comienzos, sino que además compartió generosamente sus ideas y las discutió con estimulante pasión. (shrink)

É comumente aceito, atualmente, que Aristóteles não teria enfrentado ou tentado seriamente resolver o famoso paradoxo do mentiroso, embora ele tenha sido formulado por Eubúlides de Mileto, membro da escola megárica e rival filosófico de Aristóteles. No máximo, assim reza a visão tradicional, ele parece apenas fazer uma menção desse paradoxo nas Refutações sofísticas, Capítulo 25, talvez esboçando a sua solução. O meu intento, no presente artigo, é desafiar essa opinião geral mostrando que o Estagirita fornece uma explicação implícita para (...) duas versões do paradoxo do mentiroso, a saber, a versão autorreferencial (que pode ser apresentada pela declaração: “esta declaração é falsa”), e a versão anafórica (que pode ser apresentada por meio de duas declarações mutuamente referentes como estas: “a próxima declaração é verdadeira” e “a declaração anterior é falsa”). A minha alegação é que a solução aristotélica para essas duas versões do paradoxo encontra-se no núcleo de sua refutação de duas teses, as quais denominei como tese da synalethia (que defende que toda declaração é verdadeira) e como tese da sympseudia (que defende que toda declaração é falsa). Tal refutação é realizada no oitavo capítulo do quarto Livro da Metafísica, um texto até agora subestimado pelos intérpretes modernos, mesmo sendo a parte final de um dos mais importantes escritos de Aristóteles. A solução aristotélica, assim defendo, é levada a cabo por meio dos seguintes princípios: (i) toda declaração é sempre precedida por um operador de verdade da forma ‘é verdade que...’, ou seja, toda declaração, qualquer que seja o que ela possa declarar a mais, primariamente assevera a sua própria verdade; e, em conformidade com o princípio anterior, (ii) toda declaração que assevera a sua própria falsidade ou acarreta a verdade de sua contraditória é necessariamente falsa. Através desses princípios, a refutação de Aristóteles da synalethia e da sympseudia é bem-sucedida. Mostrarei que obtemos uma boa solução para as versões do mentiroso acima mencionadas (e implicitamente presentes nas posições refutadas), apenas aplicando esses mesmos princípios a elas. Esse tipo de solução ao mentiroso tanto quanto para as teses antes citadas é muito parecido com aquele explicitamente encontrado nas obras de diversos filósofos, a saber, Guilherme de Sherwood, Tomás Bradwardine, João Buridano, Alberto da Saxônia, Paulo Venetus, Charles S. Peirce e Arthur Prior. Assim, também defendo que essa linhagem tem as suas raízes na solução de Aristóteles. (shrink)

Aproximaciones teóricas a la danza es producto de un trabajo investigativo conjunto que permite la circulación del conocimiento producido por distintos actores involucrados en el campo de la danza en Colombia. Para la Red de Investigación Cuerpo Danza Movimiento, esta publicación es un logro investigativo colectivo que ofrece una visión del conjunto de esfuerzos y perspectivas actuales sobre la danza en Colombia y en otras latitudes en donde este arte se ha ido convirtiendo en un objeto de estudio específico. En (...) este volumen se encuentran textos sobre la relación danza y filosofía, de Carlos Eduardo Sanabria (Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano); la relación danza y antropología, de Andrea Ceballos Flórez y la danza contemporánea como campo de investigación de la antropología (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana); un estudio etnográfico de la salsa en Bogotá, de el de Ángela R. Leguizamón (Universidad Nacional, Universidad Distrital FJC); la política cultural y la participación del sector en la políticas distritales, de el de Laura de la Rosa, Diana C. Varón y Aidaluz Sánchez A. (Universidad Santo Tomás). Sobre estudios historiográficos, Juliana Congote se centra en los procesos editoriales y la consolidación de las comunidades de interpretación de la danza contemporánea en el país (Universidad de Antioquia ); y en estudios sociales Liliana Echeverri, sobre la relación del baile social con los espacios sociales que aparecen en Manrique, Medellín (Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ecuador) y el texto de Patricio Juárez F., sobre la práctica artística de la danza y su relevancia como fenómeno sociocultural (Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, México); igualmente encontramos sobre filosofía el texto propuesto por Paola V. Pita Gaona, quien analiza la teoría de la acción poética y la danza en Paul Valéry (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana ); y sobre medios interactivos de Gloria S. Sáenz, en la exploración investigativa realizada en la Escuela tecnológica del Instituto Técnico Central, sobre la utilización del Smartphone (como videocámara) para la producción discursiva, creando nuevas aproximaciones al mundo (Escuela Tecnológica ITC), y finalmente, el texto de Rebeca Sánchez A., sobre la transformación en la creación, la contemplación y la participación, de la experiencia dancística cuando son utilizados recursos tecnológicos (UNAM, México). (shrink)

Sumário: 1. El caso del método científico, Alberto Oliva; 2. Un capítulo de la prehistoria de las ciencias humanas: la defensa por Vico de la tópica, Jorge Alberto Molina; 3. La figura de lo cognoscible y los mundos, Pablo Vélez León; 4. Lebenswelt de Husserl y las neurociencias, Vanessa Fontana; 5. El uso estético del concepto de mundos posibles, Jairo Dias Carvalho; 6. Realismo normativo no naturalista y mundos morales imposibles, Alcino Eduardo Bonella; 7. En la (...) lógica de pragmatismo, Hércules de Araujo Feitosa, Luiz Henrique da Cruz Silvestrini; 8 La lógica, el tiempo y el lenguaje natural: un sistema formal para tiempos de portugués, Carlos Luciano Manholi. / Temas em filosofia contemporânea II / Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart, Jaimir Conte, Cezar Augusto Mortari (orgs.) – Florianópolis : NEL/UFSC, 2016. 167 p. : tabs. - (Rumos da epistemologia ; v. 14); ISBN 978-85-87253-27-9 (papel); ISBN 978-85-87253-26-2 (e-book). (shrink)

This essay is my review of Colleen Dyble’s book, Taming Leviathan: Waging a War of Ideas around the World. Dyble is affiliated with the legendary classical liberal British think tank, the Institute of Economic Affairs. Her anthology is a collection of essays by people around the world who have been involved with similar free-market think tanks in countries with historically statist economic systems. These writers include Greg Lindsay, founder of the Center for Independent Studies in Australia; Margaret Tse, of the (...) Instituto Liberdade in Brazil; Michael Walker, co-founder of the Fraser Institute in Canada; Cristian Larroulet, of Libertad y Desarrollo in Chile; Giancarlo Ibarguen, of the Center for Economic and Social Studies in Guatemala (which actually founded a free-market-oriented university); Parth Shah, founder of the Center for Civil Society in India; Daniel Doron, co-founder of the Israeli Center for Social and Economic Progress; Alberto Mingardi, of the Instituto Bruno Leoni in Italy; Masaru Uchigama, founder of the Japanese for Tax Reform; Elena Leontjeva, co-founder of the Lithuanian Free Market Institute; Alexander Magno, co-founder of the Foundation for Economic Freedom in the Philippines; and last, Leon Louw, of the Free Market Foundation of South Africa. I then discuss seven important reasons why classical liberal think tanks are so important in modern societies. (shrink)

In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic is to (...) be identified with an infinite sequence of consequence relations holding between increasingly complex relata: formulae, inferences, metainferences, and so on. As a result, the present proposal allows not only to differentiate Classical Logic from ST, but also from other systems sharing with it their valid metainferences. Finally, we show how these results have interesting consequences for some topics in the philosophical logic literature, among them for the debate around Logical Pluralism. The reason being that the discussion concerning this topic is usually carried out employing a rivalry criterion for logics that will need to be modified in light of the present investigation, according to which two logics can be non-identical even if they share the same valid inferences. (shrink)

On various occasions, Kendall Walton has put forward a theory of depiction based on the notion of make-believe: P depicts something only if in virtue of having a perception of P, one makes believe that that very experience is the perception of P’s subject. As a consequence, if an individual is not able to make believe, whatever they face in their perception does not count as a depiction for her. Yet there are many evidences from developmental psychology that show that (...) very little children still unable to make believe can grasp a picture’s figurative value. As a result, Walton’s theory of depiction seems to be inadequate from an empirical point of view. Moreover, it also appears to be inadequate from a conceptual point of view. Walton’s ambition is to account in pretence-theoretical terms of what the twofold experience of seeing-in, which Wollheim took to be a necessary condition of depiction, amounts to. Yet relying on make-believe, hence on imagination, does not account for the genuinely perceptual character of the “seeing-in” experience. No treatment of imagination in terms of visualization seems to achieve such a purpose. (shrink)

In some recent articles, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley, & van Rooij have defended the idea that abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes. For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain a nontransitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid. However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there are not certain safe instances of Cut (...) involving semantic notions. In this article we intend to meet the challenge of answering how to regain all the safe instances of Cut, in the language of the theory, making essential use of a unary recovery operator. To fulfill this goal, we will work within the so-called Goodship Project, which suggests that in order to have nontrivial naïve theories it is sufficient to formulate the corresponding self-referential sentences with suitable biconditionals. Nevertheless, a secondary aim of this article is to propose a novel way to carry this project out, showing that the biconditionals in question can be totally classical. In the context of this article, these biconditionals will be essentially used in expressing the self-referential sentences and, thus, as a collateral result of our work we will prove that none of the recoveries expected of the target theory can be nontrivially achieved if self-reference is expressed through identities. (shrink)

Rejecting the Cut rule has been proposed as a strategy to avoid both the usual semantic paradoxes and the so-called v-Curry paradox. In this paper we consider if a Cut-free theory is capable of accurately representing its own notion of validity. We claim that the standard rules governing the validity predicate are too weak for this purpose and we show that although it is possible to strengthen these rules, the most obvious way of doing so brings with it a serious (...) problem: an internalized version of Cut can be proved for a Curry-like sentence. We also evaluate a number of possible ways of escaping this difficulty. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the extent to which the very existence of substructural logics puts the Tarskian conception of logical systems in jeopardy. In order to do this, we highlight the importance of the presence of different levels of entailment in a given logic, looking not only at inferences between collections of formulae but also at inferences between collections of inferences—and more. We discuss appropriate refinements or modifications of the usual Tarskian identity criterion for logical systems, and propose an (...) alternative of our own. After that, we consider a number of objections to our account and evaluate a substantially different approach to the same problem. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a non-trivial and expressively complete paraconsistent naïve theory of truth, as a step in the route towards semantic closure. We achieve this goal by expressing self-reference with a weak procedure, that uses equivalences between expressions of the language, as opposed to a strong procedure, that uses identities. Finally, we make some remarks regarding the sense in which the theory of truth discussed has a property closely related to functional completeness, and we present a sound and (...) complete three-sided sequent calculus for this expressively rich theory. (shrink)

When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...) sense, non-identical to it. We argue that this phenomenon can be generalized, given the existence of logics which coincide with Classical Logic regarding a number of metainferential levels—although they are, again, clearly different systems. We claim this highlights the need to arrive at a more refined version of the Collapse Argument, which we discuss at the end of the paper. (shrink)

Several scholars have criticized the histories of early modern philosophy based on the dichotomy of empiricism and rationalism. They view them as overestimating the importance of epistemological issues for early modern philosophers (epistemological bias), portraying Kant's Critical philosophy as a superior alternative to empiricism and rationalism (Kantian bias), and forcing most or all early modern thinkers prior to Kant into the empiricist or rationalist camps (classificatory bias). Kant is often said to be the source of the three biases. Against this (...) criticism, this paper argues that Kant did not have the three biases. However, he promoted a way of writing histories of philosophy from which those biases would naturally flow. (shrink)

Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: “Truth is the agreement of cognition with its object”. In this paper, I analyse the relevant features of Kant's theory of definition in order to explain the meaning of that claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant endorses or rejects a correspondence theory of truth. I conclude that Kant's claim implies neither that he holds, nor that he rejects, a correspondence theory of truth. Kant's claim is not (...) a generic way of setting aside a correspondence definition of truth, or of considering it uninformative. Being the nominal definition of truth, the formula “truth is the agreement of cognition with its object” illustrates the meaning of the predicate “is true” and people's ordinary conception of truth. True judgements correspond to the objects they are about. However, there could be more to the property of truth than correspondence. (shrink)

This paper traces the ancestry of a familiar historiographical narrative, according to which early modern philosophy was marked by the development of empiricism, rationalism, and their synthesis by Immanuel Kant. It is often claimed that this narrative became standard in the nineteenth century, due to the influence of Thomas Reid, Kant and his disciples, or German Hegelians and British Idealists. The paper argues that the narrative became standard only at the turn of the twentieth century. This was not due to (...) the influence of Reid, German Hegelians, or British Idealists as they did not endorse the narrative, although Thomas Hill Green may have facilitated its uptake. The narrative is based on Kant’s historiographical sketches, as corrected and integrated by Karl Leonhard Reinhold. It was first fleshed out into full-fledged histories by two Kantians, Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann and Johann Gottlieb Buhle. Numerous historians, several of whom were not Kantians, spread it in the English-speaking world. They include Kuno Fischer, Friedrich Ueberweg, Richard Falckenberg, and Wilhelm Windelband. However, the wide availability of their works did not suffice to make the narrative standard because, until the 1890s, the Hegelian account was at least as popular as theirs. Among the factors that allowed the narrative to become standard are its aptness to be adopted by philosophers of the most diverse persuasions, its simplicity and suitability for teaching. (shrink)

In his essay against Eberhard, Kant denies that there are innate concepts. Several scholars take Kant’s statement at face value. They claim that Kant did not endorse concept innatism, that the categories are not innate concepts, and that Kant’s views on innateness are significantly different from Leibniz’s. This paper takes issue with those claims. It argues that Kant’s views on the origin of the intellectual concepts are remarkably similar to Leibniz’s. Given two widespread notions of innateness, the dispositional notion and (...) the input/output notion, intellectual concepts are innate for Kant no less than for Leibniz. (shrink)

The nature of pre-reflective self-consciousness—viz., the putative non-inferential self-consciousness involved in unreflective experiences, has become the topic of considerable debate in recent analytic philosophy of consciousness, as it is commonly taken to be what makes conscious mental states first-personally given to its subject. A major issue of controversy in this debate concerns what pre-reflective self-consciousness is an awareness of. Some scholars have suggested that pre-reflective self-consciousness involves an awareness of the experiencing subject. This ‘egological view’ is opposed to the ‘non-egological (...) view’, according to which the subject, in being pre-reflectively self-conscious, is just aware of their own occurrent mental state. In this paper, I argue in favour of the egological view. The argument I develop is a qualified version of a line of reasoning originally provided by Rosenthal and builds on a proper clarification of the ontological status of token mental states. More precisely, I argue that token mental states are structured ‘fact-like’ entities having their subject among their constituents. Accordingly, one cannot be aware of one’s own occurrent mental state without thereby being aware of oneself. (shrink)

Recently, it has been proposed to understand a logic as containing not only a validity canon for inferences but also a validity canon for metainferences of any finite level. Then, it has been shown that it is possible to construct infinite hierarchies of "increasingly classical" logics—that is, logics that are classical at the level of inferences and of increasingly higher metainferences—all of which admit a transparent truth predicate. In this paper, we extend this line of investigation by taking a somehow (...) different route. We explore logics that are different from classical logic at the level of inferences, but recover some important aspects of classical logic at every metainferential level. We dub such systems meta-classical non-classical logics. We argue that the systems presented deserve to be regarded as logics in their own right and, moreover, are potentially useful for the non-classical logician. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es clarificar la noción de «vida auténtica» tal y como es descrita por Joan Roura-Parella en su última obra Tema y variaciones de la personalidad (1950). Por «vida auténtica» se entiende una vida autogobernada, que permite al individuo realizar su propia singularidad y, por tanto, preservar su autonomía y dignidad como persona. Una vida dominada por factores ajenos al propio individuo, sean cuales sean éstos, es una vida alienada, que no permite el desarrollo del individuo (...) en tanto la persona que es. Se señala la relevancia filosófica de la propuesta de Roura-Parella, que es la de ofrecer una justificación no-evidencial para una forma de vida cristiana, agapística. De acuerdo con Roura-Parella, una forma de vida basada en la entrega amorosa para con el prójimo está justificada en tanto que ésta es el resultado último de nuestra propia condición natural, constituyendo así un acto de afirmación personal y siendo, por tanto, condición necesaria para gozar de una vida auténtica — «la vida alcanza su hondo sentido al salirse de sí misma para darse a los demás» (Roura-Parella, Tema y variaciones de la personalidad, 1950, p. 229). Se señalan las diferencias y semejanzas de la propuesta de Roura-Parella con respecto a las de Miguel de Unamuno y Joaquim Xirau, autores que fueron cercanos a Roura-Parella y quienes, aunque partiendo de razonamientos distintos a los de Roura-Parella, también concibieron la entrega amorosa para con el prójimo como un acto de afirmación personal. (shrink)

What does it mean to say that some features, such as gender, race and sexual orientation, are socially constructed? Many scholars claim that social constructionism about a kind is a version of realism about that kind, according to which the corresponding kind is a social construction, that it, it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructionism, then, is a version of realism about a kind that asserts that the kind is real, and puts forward a particular view about (...) the nature of the kind, namely, that it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructivists about human kinds such as gender, race and sexual orientation often make an additional claim, namely, that these kinds are social constructions but they are typically believed to be biological kinds (that is, people are typically wrong about the nature of these kinds). Ron Mallon (2017) calls social constructions that are (falsely) taken to be biological kinds covert social constructions. This paper is about how we could have terms in our natural language that come to refer to covert social constructions. (shrink)

In this paper, I will first try to provide a new argument in favour of the contextualist position on the semantics/pragmatics divide. I will argue that many puns, notably multi-stable ones, cannot be dealt with in the non-contextualist way, i.e., as displaying a phenomenon that effectively involves wide context, the concrete situation of discourse, yet only in a pre-, or at least inter-, semantic sense. For, insofar as they involve ambiguous utterances rather than ambiguous sentences, these puns show that the (...) wide context affecting them has a semantic role: it provides many truth-conditions for a single utterance. Moreover, I will try to show that the contextualist can provide a unitary account of the general phenomenon of puns. On the one hand, this account explains multi-stable puns as well as those puns the non-contextualist claims to deal with successfully, i.e., the ones involving a speaker-induced removal of a well-grounded misunderstanding. On the other hand, it also explains zeugmatic puns, i.e., those involving an ‘impossible’ meaning. (shrink)

Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims. Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: (1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans (...) cannot have experience. (2) Kant sometimes states that truth-apt judgements are actual bearers of truth or falsity only when they are taken to state what is actually the case. Kant calls these judgements assertoric. Other texts ascribe truth and falsity to judgements, regardless of whether they are assertoric. Kant's views on truth-aptness raise challenges for correspondentist and coherentist interpretations of Kant's theory of truth; they rule out the identification of Kant's crucial notion of objective validity with truth-aptness; and they imply that Kant was not a verificationist about truth or meaning. (shrink)

It’s constitutive of classical theism that there is a necessarily existent personal god who is also the creator of the universe, where the latter claim includes at least the following three theses: (i) God is wholly distinct from the natural world; (ii) God is the originating or sustaining cause of the natural world; and (iii) God created the natural world ex nihilo, i.e., without the use of pre-existing materials. Call this tripartite component of classical theism the classical view of creation. (...) In this paper, I offer a new argument against classical theism. In particular, I argue that creation ex nihilo is prima facie impossible, and that since the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is constitutive of classical theism, classical theism is false. (shrink)

According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a (...) kind such that its members figure (for independent reasons) in such an inventory. Negatively put, if there are no things of a certain metaphysical kind, thoughts about things of that kind are not really committed to such things. Pace Crane, however, this does not mean that the intentionalia that are really there are only those that exist. For existence, qua first-order property, is no metaphysical kind. Thus, there may really be intentionalia that do not exist, provided that they belong to good metaphysical kinds. (shrink)

In this paper, I will defend the claim that there are three existence properties: the second-order property of being instantiated, a substantive first-order property (or better a group of such properties) and a formal, hence universal, first-order property. I will first try to show what these properties are and why we need all of them for ontological purposes. Moreover, I will try to show why a Meinong-like option that positively endorses both the former and the latter first-order property is the (...) correct view in ontology. Finally, I will add some methodological remarks as to why this debate has to be articulated from the point of view of reality, i.e., by speaking of properties, rather than from the point of view of language, i.e., by speaking of predicates (for such properties). (shrink)

The prologue of the Sophistici elenchi is as close an Aristotelian text gets to dealing with language as a subject matter in its own right, only in reverse. Language and its features bear consideration to the extent that they account for some major predicaments discursive reasoning is prone to, both as a separate and as a common endeavour. That being said, the linguistic pitfalls that trick us into thinking that whatever is the case for words and word-compounds is also the (...) case for the things and facts linguistic items stand for reveal as much about good linguistic habits and sound argumentation as they themselves are revealed by the principles and rules our argumentation goes by. In this connection, Aristotle resorted to a curious (or not so curious) analogy between words and counters which played a major role in explaining why language is such a powerful source of illusion and deception. As it happens, Aristotle accounting analogy is a case in point for showcasing the level of sophistication medieval Latin literature on fallacies achieved as early as the first half of the twelfth century. As a matter of fact, Western commentators managed to build compelling cases both in favour of and against the understanding that was to become and still is the standard story – which, of course, speaks volumes about their exegetical proficiency and technical expertise. On the one hand, trusting implicitly Boethius’ translation and well aware of his views on disputational hazards as opposed to computational reliability, they usually understood Aristotle’s comparison as if it was an analogy in name only. On the other hand, despite Boethius’ translation put them at a considerable disadvantage, Latin commentators were able to construe Aristotle’s analogy as bringing together two sets of symbolic variables (words and counters) that are neither entirely free nor entirely bound – which expose them to subtle but critical shifts in value and meaning. (shrink)

How do we form concepts like those of three, bicycle and red? According to Kant, we form them by carrying out acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction on information provided by the senses. Kant's answer raised numerous objections from philosophers and psychologists alike. "Kant e la formazione dei concetti" argues that Kant is able to rebut those objections. The book shows that, for Kant, it is possible to perceive objects without employing concepts; it explains how, given those perceptions, we can (...) form categories and empirical concepts; and it argues that theories like Kant's - abstractionist theories of concept formation - are more plausible than is often assumed. (shrink)

Feminist considerations have induced a rethinking of many aspects of our contemporary world, such as the concept of gender and power relations. This has led to a re-examination of the entire previous tradition of thought, finding in phallogocentrism the paradigm of reference. This term indicates, starting with Derrida's considerations, the Western tendency to have centred not only the logos, but also the phallus, weaving an intricate relationship between masculinity and language. It's precisely this bond that makes man the archetype on (...) which society is founded, placing his supremacy in the natural order, defining power relations and nailing pre-established categories. A being-nailed in the Lévinasian sense, thus an adherence between the agreement of voices and being, which produces 'category-beings' in which pre-delineated social identity is concealed in a condition of 'nature', such as the 'being-male'. It's precisely this naturalness, discursively produced, that has made man universal. Consequently, man has convinced himself that he can speak for all humanity, becoming the logos through which he declines the rest. Declinations that have produced rigid and hierarchical categories that precede and define each person, prescribing 'consonant' ways, rhetorically assumed as 'human nature'. The "nature" of being man or woman does not, in fact, concern monolithic essentialisms, but rather movements of intertwined meanings in a process that Derrida defines as différance. A process, therefore, in becoming, which has over time produced unequal power relations, justifying them as "natural", and which daily reiterates a hegemonic and sexist social model. The aim of this analysis, hence, will be to bring phallogocentric masculinity and consequent hegemonic structures into the field of philosophical reflection, with the purpose of redirecting praxis towards performative processes of characterisation the person, rather than a pre-delineated categorisation. Thus, to release being from socio-cultural categories, which historical-performative praxis nails to each body. (shrink)

In this note we shall argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. According to Truthmaker Maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker. Milne has attempted to refute it using the following self-referential sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. Essential to his refutation is that M is like the Gödel sentence and unlike the Liar, and one way in which Milne supports this assimilation is through the claim that his proof is essentially object-level and not semantic. In Section (...) 2, we shall argue that Milne is still begging the question against Truthmaker Maximalism. In Section 3, we shall argue that even assimilating M to the Liar does not force the truthmaker maximalist to maintain the ‘dull option’ that M does not express a proposition. There are other options open and, though they imply revising the logic in Milne’s reasoning, this is not one of the possible revisions he considers. In Section 4, we shall suggest that Milne’s proof requires an implicit appeal to semantic principles and notions. In Section 5, we shall point out that there are two important dissimilarities between M and the Gödel sentence. Section 6 is a brief summary and conclusion. (shrink)

This paper discusses Immanuel Kant’s views on the role of experiments in natural science, focusing on their relationship with hypotheses, laws of nature, and the heuristic principles of scientific enquiry. Kant’s views are contrasted with the philosophy of experiment that was first sketched by Francis Bacon and later developed by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. Kant holds that experiments are always designed and carried out in the light of hypotheses. Hypotheses are derived from experience on the basis of a set (...) of heuristic principles. The function of experiments is testing hypotheses in order to either reject them as false, or else to transform them into empirical laws of nature. To this end, we must integrate the hypotheses that are confirmed by experiments with the a priori principles which are the foundations of natural science. Compared with Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, Kant has elaborate views on the one hand, on how our theoretical and pre-theoretical assumptions bear on experimental practice, and on the other hand, on how the results of experimental activity can be integrated with theories to advance our knowledge of nature. However, Kant overstates the dependence of experiments on theories. (shrink)

The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphysics, with many different views about the nature of gender and race being submitted and discussed. But what are these debates about? What questions are these accounts trying to answer? And is there real disagreement between advocates of differ- ent views about race or gender? If so, what are they really disagreeing about? In this paper I want to develop a view about what the debates (...) in the metaphysics of gender and race are about, namely, a version of metaphysical deflationism, according to which these debates are about how we actually use or should use the terms ‘gender’ and ‘race’ (and other related terms), where moral and political considerations play a central role. I will also argue that my version of the view can overcome some recent and powerful objections to metaphysical deflationism of- fered by Elizabeth Barnes (2014, 2017). (shrink)

Feminist reflections have led to a rethinking of many aspects of our contemporary world, such as the concept of masculinity and its power relations. In Western civilisation, in fact, man is the archetype, thus making his supremacy part of the natural order of things. This very naturalness, discursively produced and performed, is what has made man invisible and universal, hence without the need to think-and think oneself-in terms of gender. As a result, man has convinced himself that he is not (...) influenced by his own masculinity and can speak for all mankind, becoming the logos through which he declines the rest, prescribing 'consonant' ways of being a man or a woman. Historically, then, different power relations have developed, generating violent forms of communication that, on a daily basis, reiterate a hegemonic and sexist social model. This has led to the production of certain stereotypical attributes that have subsequently flowed into different social dynamics, establishing different roles and work possibilities that have welded structural problems: such as, for example, the 'glass ceiling'. The aim of this analysis, therefore, will be to reason about the concept of masculinity and the consequent hegemonic-linguistic structures, wondering how such reflections can be translated back into the corporate sphere. This is with the aim of producing anti-discriminatory and equal systems that improve workers' conditions, as well as their general outlook on gender issues. The methodology adopted will see the use of philosophical-pragmatic theoretical reflection, in particular around the theory of linguistic performativity, fused with empirical data collection in the corporate sphere as a result of questionnaires, contextual analyses and training courses carried out at an Italian corporation. (shrink)

Transhumanism proposes human enhancement while regarding the human body as unfit for the future. This fulfills age-old aspirations for a perfect and durable body. We use “alienation” as a concept to analyze this mismatch between human aspirations and our current condition. For Hannah Arendt alienation may be accounted for in terms of earth- and world-alienation, as well as alienation from human nature, and especially from the given (“resentment of the given”). In transhumanism, the biological body is an impediment to human (...) accomplishment. At most, this movement accepts “clean” bodies, not bodies with excretions. We argue that real human bodies are valued in the event of giving birth, so a modified concept that Arendt proposed, natality, seems a suitable way to explore the dialectic alienation-reconciliation involving the body (Arendt’s “A child has been born unto us”), when re-read by some feminist scholars. (shrink)

In prayers lie the experiences, dreams, and identity of the individual. These strengthen faith while fortifying one’s character. This research examines the Dororo of the Ayta Ambala, a native prayer considered a convergence of the community’s experiences, aspirations, and faith. Using a Filipino-centric research approach (Maka-Pilipinong Pananaliksik), nine Dororo were gathered from Sitio Mampuweng, Olongapo City, Zambales, and classified into three types: Dororong Ritwal, a collective prayer for the community; Dororong Panganganito, a healing ritual; and Pansariling Dororo, personal prayers for (...) daily needs. Four themes emerged within the prayers: gratitude, protection, abundant harvest, and remembrance of the deceased. The Dororo reflects Ayta Ambala’s connection to nature, community, and spirituality. This research emphasizes the importance of documentation and knowledge transmission to preserve cultural heritage. The Dororo demonstrates the resilience of the Ayta Ambala amidst modernization and external religious influences while safeguarding their traditional identity. (shrink)

[ES] En este trabajo propedéutico, a través de los propios textos de Kant, intentaré ofrecer una descripción equilibrada y una reconstrucción sucinta de los argumentos que ofrece Kant acerca de la posibilidad e imposibilidad de la metafísica. En primer lugar presentaré algunas críticas a la metafísica, luego visualizaré la noción kantiana de metafísica, así como sus razones y momentos constitutivos; y finalmente, analizaré que tipo de conocimiento es la metafísica y las características y naturaleza de esta para que sea viable (...) dicha «ciencia». Para realizar este cometido, asumiré la hipótesis de que la metafísica para Kant, en correspondencia con la resolucion de la tercera cuestion del conocimiento, es una ciencia que integra razón práctica y teórica en un sistema universal que busca la transcendencia. Si la metafísica tiene alguna posibilidad, ésta probablemente sería la vía. [EN] In this propaedeutic work, through Kant’s own texts, I will try to offer a balanced description and a succinct reconstruction of Kant’s arguments about the possibility and impossibility of Metaphysics. In the first place I will present some criticisms of Metaphysics, then I will visualize the Kantian notion of Metaphysics, as well as its constitutive reasons and moments; and finally, I will analyze what kind of knowledge is Metaphysics and the characteristics and nature of it, so that this «science» is viable. In order to carry out this task, I will assume the hypothesis that Kant’s Metaphysics, in correspondence with the resolution of the third question of knowledge, is a science that integrates practical and theoretical reason into a universal system that seeks transcendence. If Metaphysics has any chance, this would probably be the way. (shrink)

Conscientious objection in health care is a form of compromise whereby health care practitioners can refuse to take part in safe, legal, and beneficial medical procedures to which they have a moral opposition (for instance abortion). Arguments in defense of conscientious objection in medicine are usually based on the value of respect for the moral integrity of practitioners. I will show that philosophical arguments in defense of conscientious objection based on respect for such moral integrity are extremely weak and, if (...) taken seriously, lead to consequences that we would not (and should not) accept. I then propose that the best philosophical argument that defenders of conscientious objection in medicine can consistently deploy is one that appeals to (some form of) either moral relativism or subjectivism. I suggest that, unless either moral relativism or subjectivism is a valid theory—which is exactly what many defenders of conscientious objection (as well as many others) do not think—the role of moral integrity and conscientious objection in health care should be significantly downplayed and left out of the range of ethically relevant considerations. (shrink)

Gender studies have generated numerous questions regarding the potential of language and the power relations it produces, especially after the philosopher Judith Butler's reinterpretation of Austinian performativity theory. She in fact reinterpreted this theory not only in linguistic terms, but also in relation to the normative power that nails biological fates to anatomical bodies, pinning them into roles and permissions defined by dominant praxis. With the theory of gender performativity, the connection between language, identity and power becomes even clearer and (...) more incisive, seeing hate speech as playing a central role in both the maintenance of praxis and the disciplining of people in accordance with such praxis. Starting from a reflection on the universalization of man through the appropriation of language-logos, the aim of this paper will therefore be to highlight the intricate link between hate speech and hegemonic masculinity. It will then emphasize how the denigrating and punitive functionality of hate speech is central to the reiteration of the subordinating binarism on which patriarchal hegemony is founded. In this way, it will be possible to think of strategies, such as re-signification, that not only disarm the violent potential of hate speech, but also contribute to rewriting the underlying social praxis, producing anti-discriminatory and equalitarian models. (shrink)

"This book presents a theoretical discussion of problems and issues encountered in the Native American community from a perspective that accepts Native knowledge as legitimate. Native American cosmology and metaphor are used extensively in order to deal with specific problems such as alcoholism, suicide, family, and community problems. The authors discuss what it means to present material from the perspective of a people who have legitimate ways of knowing and conceptualizing reality and show that it is imperative to understand intergenerational (...) trauma and internalized oppression in order to understand the issues facing Native Americans today."--pub. website. (shrink)

The articles in the symposium “Teaching Early Modern Philosophy: New Approaches” provide theoretical reflections and practical advice on new ways of teaching undergraduate survey courses in early modern philosophy. This introduction lays out the rationale for the symposium and summarizes the articles that compose it.

A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth (...) based on ᴌukasiewicz infinitely valued logic: PAᴌT. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a syncretistic theory of depiction, which combines the merits of the main paradigms which have hitherto faced themselves on this issue, namely the perceptualist and semioticist approaches. The syncretistic theory indeed takes from the former its stress on experiential factors and from the latter its stress on conventional factors. But the theory is even more syncretistic than this, for the way it accounts for the experiential factor vindicates several claims defended by different perceptualist theories. (...) In a nutshell, according to the syncretistic theory a picture depicts its subject iff i) it is transformed into an entity-cum-meaning and ii) one has the twofold experience of seeing that subject in the picture qua noninterpreted entity, the image, just in case one consciously misrecognizes it in consciously seeing that image, for that subject resembles the image in some grouping properties (originally labelled Gestalt-qualities in psychology). By appealing to objective resemblance in grouping properties, the theory can vindicate what are nowadays taken to be the most neglected doctrines in the perceptualist camp: objective resemblance theories. By appealing, moreover, to conscious misrecognition, the theory not only squares with both the seeing-in and the recognition theories of depiction, but it also shows the grain of truth in illusion theories of depiction, since conscious misrecognition is a kind of perceptual illusion. (shrink)

In this paper I want to show that the idea supporters of traditional creationism (TC) defend, that success of a fictional character across different works has to be accounted for in terms of the persistence of (numerically) one and the same fictional entity, is incorrect. For the supposedly commonsensical data on which those supporters claim their ideas rely are rather controversial. Once they are properly interpreted, they can rather be accommodated by moderate creationism (MC), according to which fictional characters arise (...) out of a reflexive stance on a certain make-believe process. For MC, success of a fictional character across different works amounts to the fact that, first, different work-bound ficta are related with each other by means of a relation weaker than numerical identity, transfictional sameness, and second, that all those ficta are related by transfictional inclusion to a fictum that in some sense gather them all, the so-called general character. Since a general character is an abstract constructed entity, moreover, the more those particular ficta are generated, the more general fictional characters including all of them arise. (shrink)

Gender studies has produced various analyses around issues such as social “roles,”coexistence and power relations; seeing language as a central aspect, especially since the development of performativity theory produced by philosopher Judith Butler. In this paper, so, I would like to focus on the existing relationship between language and gender relations, particularly in the workplace; pointing out how some possibilities and structures are dense with unequal and sexist modalities. The analysis will consist of a first theoretical section, in which the (...) specific relationship between the gendered “male”subject and language will be emphasized, and a second in which these considerations will be portrayed in the corporate context. The purpose is to show how specific aspects of masculinity have generated specific power relations, delineating, and defining stereotypes and categorizing views. Attributes that have then flowed into the different social dynamics of our society, establishing different job roles and possibilities. To give more profundity, I adopted a methodology that fuses the logical-linguistic theoretical perspective, to the analysis of empirical data collected through interviews, questionnaires, and training meetings at two partner companies. (shrink)

In a paper recently published in this journal, Navin and Largent argue in favour of a type of policy to regulate non-medical exemptions from childhood vaccination which they call ‘Inconvenience’. This policy makes it burdensome for parents to obtain an exemption to child vaccination, for example, by requiring parents to attend immunization education sessions and to complete an application form to receive a waiver. Navin and Largent argue that this policy is preferable to ‘Eliminationism’, i.e. to policies that do not (...) allow non-medical exemptions, because Inconvenience has been shown to maintain exemption rates low while not harming parents by forcing them to do something that goes against their beliefs. We argue that it is at least doubtful that Inconvenience is ethically preferable to Eliminationism: while the latter disregards the value of liberty, Inconvenience disregards the value of fairness in the distribution of the burdens entailed by the preservation of a public good like herd immunity. We propose a variant of Inconvenience, which we call ‘Contribution’, which we think is preferable to the versions of Inconvenience discussed by Navin and Largent in that it successfully strikes a balance between the values of parents’ liberty, fairness and expected utility. (shrink)

Opinionated state of the art paper on mathematical explanation. After a general introduction to the subject, the paper is divided into two parts. The first part is dedicated to intra-mathematical explanation and the second is dedicated to extra-mathematical explanation. Each of these parts begins to present a set of diverse problems regarding each type of explanation and, afterwards, it analyses relevant models of the literature. Regarding the intra-mathematical explanation, the models of deformable proofs, mathematical saliences and the demonstrative structure of (...) mathematical induction are addressed. Regarding the extra-mathematical explanation, modal, abstract and deductive models are addressed. (shrink)

Technological developments involving robotics and artificial intelligence devices are being employed evermore in elderly care and the healthcare sector more generally, raising ethical issues and practical questions warranting closer considerations of what we mean by “care” and, subsequently, how to design such software coherently with the chosen definition. This paper starts by critically examining the existing approaches to the ethical design of care robots provided by Aimee van Wynsberghe, who relies on the work on the ethics of care by Joan (...) Tronto. In doing so, it suggests an alternative to their non-principled approach, an alternative suited to tackling some of the issues raised by Tronto and van Wynsberghe, while allowing for the inclusion of two orientative principles. Our proposal centres on the principles of autonomy and vulnerability, whose joint adoption we deem able to constitute an original revision of a bottom-up approach in care ethics. Conclusively, the ethical framework introduced here integrates more traditional approaches in care ethics in view of enhancing the debate regarding the ethical design of care robots under a new lens. (shrink)

The origins and development of the problem of mental causation are outlined. The underlying presuppositions which give rise to the problem are identified. Possible strategies for solving, or dissolving the problem are examined.

Alireza Bagheri supports a policy on organ procurement where individuals could choose their own definition of death between two or more socially accepted alternatives. First, we claim that such a policy, without any criterion to distinguish accepted from acceptable definitions, easily leads to the slippery slope that Bagheri tries to avoid. Second, we suggest that a public discussion about the circumstances under which the dead donor rule could be violated is more productive of social trust than constantly moving the line (...) between life and death. (shrink)

This collection highlights the new trend away from rationalism and toward empiricism in the epistemology of modality. Accordingly, the book represents a wide range of positions on the empirical sources of modal knowledge. Readers will find an introduction that surveys the field and provides a brief overview of the work, which progresses from empirically-sensitive rationalist accounts to fully empiricist accounts of modal knowledge. Early chapters focus on challenges to rationalist theories, essence-based approaches to modal knowledge, and the prospects for naturalizing (...) modal epistemology. The middle chapters present positive accounts that reject rationalism, but which stop short of advocating exclusive appeal to empirical sources of modal knowledge. The final chapters mark a transition toward exclusive reliance on empirical sources of modal knowledge. They explore ways of making similarity-based, analogical, inductive, and abductive arguments for modal claims based on empirical information. Modal epistemology is coming into its own as a field, and this book has the potential to anchor a new research agenda. (shrink)

In 1930, the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936) wrote one of his most well-known novels, San Manuel Bueno, mártir [Saint Manuel Bueno, Martyr]. The novel is about the fictional character Manuel Bueno, a catholic priest from a small Spanish village who, despite being unable to believe the Christian claim that there is an after earthly death life, devotes himself to the spiritual care of his people, being thereby sanctified after his death. The aim of this paper is to show (...) that the guideline of San Manuel Bueno, mártir is the expression, in fictional, non-philosophical language, of the conception of religious faith Unamuno had already defended in his major philosophical work, Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y los pueblos [The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations]. (shrink)